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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0)(Rep.Vol. 9 2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court below properly conclude that plaintiff had no right of action 
to seek to enforce a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act in the District Court? 
2. Did the Court below properly determine that the plaintiff failed to state an 
actionable claim for unjust enrichment? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the defendants were liable to it for 
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act for the reasonable value of prescriptions 
provided to injured employees of the employer defendants. It alleged that it had paid for 
such prescriptions which were obligations of the defendant employers or the Workers' 
Compensation Fund (WCF). The Court below granted the defendants' motion to dismiss 
on the ground that courts have no jurisdiction over claims arising under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no private right of action under the Workers' Compensation Act and the 
Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that district courts have no jurisdiction 
whatsoever to hear claims arising under the Act. 
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Plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment because such a 
claim, as against the defendant employers, is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Workers' Compensation Act and as against the WCF the complaint failed to allege 
any facts which would entitle it to relief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE 
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION ACT PROVISION FOR WHICH 
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS AN ENTITLEMENT. 
There is no private right of action to enforce the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-418 (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005). The Utah Supreme Court has articulated a four part test 
to provide guidance in determining if statutory enactments confer private rights of action, 
which test was first adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66 (1975). In Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., of America. 116 P.3d 342 (Utah 2005), 
the Court set forth the test as follows: 
(1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose 
special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether [the 
legislature] intended to create or deny a private remedy; (3) 
whether a private remedy would be consistent with the 
statute's underlying purposes; (4) the extent to which the 
cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law. 
116P.3dat347. 
Additionally, the Court noted that 
in the absence of statutory language expressly indicating a 
legislative intent to grant a private right of action, Utah courts 
are reluctant to recognize an implied right. 
2 
id at 348. 
In the present case the plaintiff satisfies none of the factors supporting a private 
right of action. It is axiomatic that the class of people sought to be benefitted by the 
Workers' Compensation Act are the working men and women of the state, not a pharmacy 
collection agency. 
The purposes which underlies the Workers' Compensation 
Act are: to assure to the injured employee and his dependents 
an income during the period of his total disability and to 
provide compensation for any resulting permanent disability; 
to accomplish this by a simple and speedy procedure which 
eliminates the expense, delay and uncertainty in having to 
prove negligence on the part of the employer; and to thus 
require industry to bear the burden of the injuries suffered in 
it. 
Wilstead v. Industrial Commission. 407 P.2d 692, 693 (Utah 1965). 
The Workers' Compensation Act was not enacted to give assignees of pharmacies 
a cause of action for resolving disputes regarding the reasonableness of prescription 
billings. 
Perhaps even more fatal to plaintiffs position is the fact that the Workers' 
Compensation Act not only doesn't expressly create a private cause of action for its 
enforcement, it creates an administrative remedy which is, as against employers, the 
exclusive remedy for any claim arising from an injury to an employee. Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-105 (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005) provides, in relevant part, that the 
right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death 
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or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and 
shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer 
imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any and all other 
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the 
employee or to the employee's spouse, widow, children, 
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, 
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee 
in the course of or because of or arising out of the employee's 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against 
an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of the 
employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an 
employee. 
(emphasis added). 
Not only does the Act not authorize civil court actions to enforce its provisions, it 
creates a comprehensive administrative procedure for its enforcement. See Utah Code 
Ann. §34A-2-801, et se£. (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005). As was noted in Sauers v. Salt Lake 
County, 735 F.Supp. 381 (D.Utah 1990), if a statute purporting to create rights or impose 
duties contains an exclusive administrative remedy, then a civil action for the alleged 
violation of those rights or duties is barred. 
As a civil action is wholly inconsistent with the Workers' Compensation Act's 
underlying purpose, plaintiffs fail the third prong of the Cort v. Ash test. The final 
portion of the test is also failed because disputes about matters governed by the Workers' 
Compensation Act have historically been resolved through administrative, and not 
judicial, processes. 
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Defendants are aware of no case where Utah's courts have implied a private right 
of action pursuant to a statute that did not expressly provide for one but are aware of 
numerous cases wherein the courts have refused to find such a right. See, for example, 
Huckner v. Kennard. 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004); Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592 (Utah 
2003); Young v. Salt Lake Citv School District, 52 P.3d 1230 (Utah 2002); and 
Broadbent v. Cache County School District Board of Education, 910 P.2d 1274 (Utah 
App. 1996). 
In Broadbent, supra, this Court reiterated what is the overriding theme of the Utah 
cases rejecting contentions that Utah statutes impliedly created private rights of action: 
"the courts of this state are not generally in the habit of implying a private right of action 
based upon state law, absent some specific direction from the Legislature." 910 P.2d at 
1278. 
The plaintiffs argument regarding its purported right to enforce the provisions of 
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act in the courts of this state fails to address the primary 
issue posed by the courts when analyzing a claim to a private right of action: did the 
legislature intend such an action be available? 
In the absence of language expressly granting a private right 
of action in the statute itself, the courts of this state are 
reluctant to imply a right of action based on state law. This 
reluctance is particularly strong when the legislature has 
already designated a method of resolution through an 
administrative agency . . . 
Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 598-99 (Utah 2003) (citations omitted). 
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The legislature has established that the Labor Commission is the forum for 
enforcement of the Workers' Compensation Act and that the right to recover 
compensation in that forum "shall be in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(1) (Rep. 
Vol. 4B 2005). 
The mere fact that a statute imposes legal duties does not mean that those duties 
give rise to a right of action in court to enforce compliance with the statute. .See, e.g., 
Youren v. Tintic School District 86 P.3d 771 (Utah App. 2004); Milliner v. Elner Fox & 
Ca, 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). 
Plaintiff has cited no authority in support of its argument that the Workers' 
Compensation Act creates a private right of action for its enforcement in a court and there 
is none. 
Lest there be any question on this point, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically 
held that Courts cannot consider claims arising under the Workers' Compensation Act. In 
Sheppick v. Albertson's. Inc.. 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 1996), the Court made clear that 
[ajlthough the Act does not specifically state that no Court 
may award benefits provided by the Act, that is its clear 
import. District courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over 
cases that fall within the purview of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
922 P.2d at 773 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs reliance on IHC v. Industrial Commission. 657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1982), 
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is completely misplaced for two reasons. First, that case did not involve an attempt to 
enforce the provisions of the Act but rather was an action by a health care provider 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Industrial Commission had no power to regulate 
the fees charged by hospitals for services provided to patients in actions by providers 
against patients. 
Second, the holding of the IHC case was changed by statute when the Legislature 
specifically deprived health care providers of the right to seek payment for medical 
services from injured workers. The present version of this statute is as follows: 
The responsibility for compensation and the payment of 
medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and 
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance 
carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. §34-A-401(2) (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005). 
The plaintiffs allegation that the defendants owe it duties pursuant to a provision 
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted by a Court. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF HAS NO CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Working RX, Inc.'s second asserted cause of action sought recovery of money it 
paid to the pharmacies, under the theory of unjust enrichment. Such a theory is 
unavailable to a plaintiff who has voluntarily paid an obligation it did not owe. The law 
is clear that a "person who voluntarily and officiously pays another's debts is not entitled 
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to reimbursement." Estate of Cleveland v. Gorden, 837 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tenn.App. 1992). 
An equitable claim for unjust enrichment is simply not available to one who voluntarily 
pays the debt of someone else because "equity will not aid a volunteer." Farm Bureau 
Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Casualty Co.. 67 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio 1946). As 
stated by the Court in Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 790 P.2d 372 (Id. 
App. 1989), 
It is well settled that a person cannot - by way of set-off, 
counterclaim or direct action- recover money which he or she 
"has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts, and 
without fraud, duress or extortion, although no obligation to 
make such payment existed." This rule, which at first blush 
seems harsh, exists to protect persons who have had 
unsolicited "benefits" thrust upon them. 
790 P.2d at 374 (citations omitted). 
As stated in the Restatement of Restitution §2 (1937), "A person who officiously 
confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor." 
As noted by the Alabama Supreme Court, 
claims based on breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and 
money had and received are precluded by proof that the 
plaintiff voluntarily paid what he or she is seeking to recover. 
Stone v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 771 S.2d 451, 456 (Ala. 2000). 
Utah law has long recognized that a mere volunteer who pays the debt of another 
does not thereby acquire an equitable claim for reimbursement. As noted in Bingham v. 
Walker Bros., 283 P. 1055, 1064 (Utah 1929), the equitable 
8 
doctrine of subrogation is not applied for the mere stranger or 
volunteer, who has paid the debt of another, without any 
assignment or agreement for subrogation, being under no 
legal obligation to make payment, and not being compelled to 
do so for the preservation of any rights in property of his own. 
As stated more recently by this Court, 
[t]he rule is well settled that a person cannot recover back 
money which he has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of 
all of the facts, without fraud, duress, or extortion in some 
form. 
Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App. 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
In Bethers, this Court also noted that 
[t]he mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract 
between two others does not make such third person liable in 
quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. There must 
be some misleading act, request for services, or the like, to 
support an action. 
Id. at 954. 
Clearly, the plaintiff has no equitable claim by virtue of having paid a bill 
allegedly owed by the defendants. If, however, plaintiff is actually claiming to be seeking 
to enforce the legal rights of the assignor pharmacy, then its claim is barred because the 
pharmacy has no legal rights against the defendants which are enforceable in the courts 
for the reasons set forth in Point I. above. 
The out of state cases cited by the plaintiff have no application to the instant 
action. They deal with the obligation of an HMO to pay the reasonable value of 
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emergency services for its medicaid eligible members whose providers are required, by 
federal law, to give treatment. The defendants' obligations to the providers in these cases 
were established by their contracts with the State or by statute. They did not arise under a 
statute containing an exclusive remedy provision and did not involve services provided by 
a volunteer. 
In the instant case, arising under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, it is 
manifest that, as against the defendant employers, the obligations of the employers are 
defined by the Act and such obligations "shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to . . . any other person whomsoever . . 
." Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l) (Rep.Vol. 4B 1995). This provision expressly prohibits 
any allegedly "equitable" relief against the employers. 
With regard to the defendant WCF, plaintiff hasn't alleged any purported benefit 
which has been conferred upon the Fund. The WCF owes no contractual or common law 
duties to the employees of its insured employers. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 
862, 866 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, the provision of services to injured employees does 
not relieve the WCF of any contractual or common law duty it would otherwise owe to 
the injured workers. 
To the extent that the pharmacy would have a statutory claim against the Fund 
arising under the Workers' Compensation Act, such a claim is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Labor Commission. As the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held, 
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"District Courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over cases that fall within the purview of 
the Workers' Compensation Act." Sheppick v. Albertson's. Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 
1996) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff attempts to assert that despite this unambiguous language, it must have a 
claim at law because, otherwise, the pharmacy would have no rights to pursue a claim in 
the Labor Commission. This assertion is both inaccurate and irrelevant. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-105(1) (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005), the Labor 
Commission is vested with rule making authority. Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-304 
(Rep.Vol. 4B 2005) gives the Commission explicit authority to make rules "governing 
adjudicative procedures . . . " The Commission has exercised this authority in adopting 
the procedure whereby a pharmacy could have its claim for prescription fees resolved. 
Rule R612-2-24 of the Utah Administrative Code (2005) provides the legal remedy for 
resolving disputes about medical payment. The Rule provides as follows: 
A. Health care providers and payors are primarily responsible 
to resolve disputes over fees for medical services between 
themselves. However, in some cases it is necessary to submit 
such disputes to the Division for resolution. The Commission 
therefore establishes the following procedure for submission 
and review of fees for medical services. 
1. The provider shall submit a bill for services rendered, with 
supporting documentation, to the payor within one year of the 
date of service; 
2. The payor shall evaluate the bill according to the 
guidelines contained in the Commission's Medical Fee 
Guidelines and RBRVS and shall pay the provider the 
appropriate fee within 45 days as required by Rule R612-2-
13. 
11 
3. If the provider believes that the payor has improperly 
computed the fee under the RBRVS, the provider or designee 
shall request the payor to reevaluate the fee. The provider's 
request for re-evaluation shall be in writing, shall describe the 
specific areas of disagreement and shall include all 
appropriate documentation. The provider shall submit all 
requests for re-evaluation to the payor within one year of the 
date of the original payment. 
4. Within 30 days of receipt of the written request for 
revaluation, the payor shall either pay the additional fee due 
the provider or respond with a specific written explanation of 
the basis for its denial of additional fees. The payor shall 
maintain proof of transmittal of its response. 
B. If the provider continues to disagree with the payor's 
determination of the appropriate fee, the provider shall submit 
the matter to the Division by filing with the Division a written 
explanation of the disagreement. The provider's explanation 
shall include copies of: 
1. The provider's original bill and supporting documentation; 
2. The payor's initial payment of that bill; 
3. The provider's request for re-evaluation and supporting 
documentation; and 
4. The payor's written explanation or its denial of additional 
fees. 
C. The Division will evaluate the dispute according to the 
requirements of the Medical Fee Guidelines and RBRVS and, 
if necessary, by consulting with the provider, payor, or 
medical specialists. Within 45 days from the date the 
Division receives the provider's request, the Division will 
mail its determination to both parties. 
D. Any party aggrieved by the Division's determination may 
file an application for hearing with the Division of 
Adjudication to obtain formal adjudication of the dispute. 
E. A payor seeking reimbursement from a provider for 
overpayment of a bill shall submit a written request to the 
provider detailing the circumstances of the payment requested 
within one year of submission of the bill. 
1. Providers should make appropriate reimbursements, or 
respond in writing detailing the reasons why repayment will 
not be made, within 90 days or receipt of a written request 
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from a payor. 
2. If a dispute as to reimbursement occurs, an aggrieved party 
may request resolution of the dispute by the Labor 
Commission. 
This is the legal mechanism by which a pharmacy's claim can be resolved in the 
Commission. 
Plaintiff claims, however, that this Rule is beyond the delegated authority of the 
Labor Commission. It is not, but even if plaintiff s assignor wasn't afforded a remedy in 
the Commission, this fact wouldn't change the result in this case. The Utah Supreme 
Court has expressly held that the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act 
bars civil actions in court even if the party filing such actions has no remedy in the Labor 
Commission. 
For example, in Morill v. J.M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), our Supreme 
Court held that the heir of a deceased worker could not maintain a wrongful death action 
even though that heir was not a dependent of the worker and, therefore, had no rights 
under the Workers' Compensation Act which could be asserted in the Commission. 
The plaintiffs attempt to characterize its second claim against the defendant WCF 
as an unjust enrichment claim is nothing more than an effort to enforce the provisions of 
the Workers' Compensation Act in court, which it cannot do. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs attempt to enforce the Workers' Compensation Act in the District Court 
was properly dismissed as there is no jurisdiction in the courts for such an action. 
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Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment against the defendant employers is barred by the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, which is in lieu of all 
other civil liability whatsoever. Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment as against the 
Workers' Compensation Fund fails to allege any facts giving rise to an equitable 
entitlement as against the Fund and, accordingly, the order of the District Court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this jH^L day of May, 2007. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By />». 
M. David/Eckersley 
Attorney for Workers' Compensation Fund 
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